[DIP-32] Revision of DAO Governance, Committees, and Budget

Proposals DIP (DAO Improvement)
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Abstract

This proposal addresses necessary updates to the SSV DAO’s Governance, Budget, and Guidelines, reflecting the DAO’s maturation and the ongoing development of the SSV Foundation. With the upcoming SSV 2.0 and current market conditions, strategic adjustments are crucial to ensure the DAO’s sustainability and efficiency. These updates also include refinements to budget management to optimize resource allocation during tight market conditions and enhance effectiveness.

Motivation

Several factors necessitate the proposed updates to the SSV DAO:

  • The DAO has significantly matured, and the SSV Foundation is now fully operational. This evolution requires aligning the DAO’s foundational documents and guidelines to reflect current operational realities.
  • The imminent launch of SSV 2.0 necessitates proactive adjustments within the DAO to ensure preparedness and alignment.
  • Current market conditions are tight, requiring prudent budget management. To mitigate the impact of minting tokens in unfavorable markets and to increase the predictability of token inflation, budget reductions and control mechanisms are essential.
  • The composition of all committees is revisited and streamlined, including adjusting baseline compensation.
  • The initial Grants Committee (GC) and Verified Operator Committee (VOC) mandates have been fulfilled, and new strategic proposals are anticipated. This juncture provides an opportunity to refine the existing guidelines and structures.

Proposal Particulars

  • Abstract
  • Motivation
  • Governance Revisions
    • SSV Foundation Transparency Policy
    • SSV Foundation Secretary Services
    • Introducing Governance “Temp Checks”
    • Core Contributors
  • Committee Revisions
    • Verified Operator Committee
    • Grants Committee
    • Dedicated Committee Voting Spaces
    • Dissolving the dGC, dLeader, and dMarketing programs
  • DAO Budget Revision
    • Mechanics
    • Budget

Governance Revisions

SSV Foundation Transparency Policy

The SSV Foundation’s “Financial Transparency Policy" establishes a framework for providing financial documentation to the SSV DAO and the Master of Coin. It mandates quarterly detailed financial reports, including income, expenditures, grants, and partnerships, to be submitted within 30 days after each quarter’s end.

On-demand documentation will be provided within 15 days of a formal request triggered by a 5/9 vote of multi-sig members. Quarterly management meetings with the accounting firm will ensure compliance and oversight. All financial activities must comply with legal regulations and be disclosed according to the governance model. The policy aims to strengthen financial management, transparency, and accountability.

Crucially, the DAO requires that this policy cannot be altered by the SSV Foundation directly; any alteration requires formal DAO approval through a vote.

The latest policy version can be found in the SSV Foundation Library.

SSV Foundation Secretary Services

The SSV Foundation Secretary Services (hereinafter “FSS”) is a service provided by the SSV Foundation to the SSV DAO to facilitate participating in the SSV DAO governance, aiming to enhance governance development and efficiency through active involvement in discussions and proposal submissions. FSS seeks to support the SSV ecosystem by supporting key initiatives, promoting diversity, and engaging with the community.

The SSV Foundation shall provide the FSS to all existing and future DAO committees and actively participate in its governance, with full voting rights as an unpaid member.

For regular community initiatives, FSS’s involvement may begin when a proposal passes the “Temp Check” as proposed in this proposal. At this point, the FSS can assist the proposer in developing a comprehensive proposal and assigning an official DIP number, marking the proposal as a key initiative. For avoidance of doubt, anyone can steward a proposal end-to-end and doesn’t need to rely on FSS. Such a service is mostly there to ease any community member to go from an idea to a quality proposal with a chance of inclusion in a reasonable time.

Additionally, FSS is responsible for facilitating the implementation of any passed proposal unless it is otherwise specified in the proposal or assigned to any other operational entity in the SSV DAO.

The ssv.network DAO Multi-Sig Committee (“MC”) can task FSS with further clarification, facilitation, or execution if the instructions of any passed proposal are unclear or require further investigation. However, the FSS clarifications, facilitations, or executions are consultative only and are not binding on any passed DAO proposal, guidance, or policy.

To accomplish its mandate, FSS has full discretion to establish working groups in accordance with the DAO constitution and allocate budgets for operational costs, external service providers, or development from the SSV Foundation’s budget within its DAO-defined limits. However, the FSS cannot contravene proposal-established DAO budgets.

Introducing Governance “Temp Checks”

A Temp Check is used to gauge community sentiment on a proposal or topic. They do not necessitate service provider involvement or a high level of precision or technicality and can be expressed less formally and in layman’s terms.

The Temp Check is as follows:

  1. A post on the forum with the title [TEMP CHECK] - X, where X is replaced with the topic name, e.g., “[TEMP CHECK] - Should the quorum be reduced?”

  2. After a minimum of 3 days of the post being on the forum, it can move to the SSV Network Snapshot with the following settings:

  3. Proposal Name: Same name as the forum post

  4. Voting period: 3-7 days

  5. Quorum: Not required

  6. Voting options: at least one option must be “No”

A successful vote is a vote that has reached a simple majority on any of its affirmative voting options. Any Temp Check must have at least one objecting voting option to be valid. Temp Check votes do not have any binding effects for the DAO or any of its mentioned organs, nor do they cause any immediate action.

However, the FSS, as described in this proposal, are tasked to assign the successfully voted temp check proposal an official DIP number and try to support the proposer to express their thoughts as a full-fledged proposal, which can proceed as a regular proposal.

Successful Temp Checks shall be seen as the future will of the DAO, and therefore, FSS shall take reasonable efforts to have that will materialize or present another Temp Check with additional details, gauging the sentiment again with additional context.

Thus, Temp Checks give everyone on the SSV DAO a clear path to present early thoughts and ideas and develop them into full-fledged proposals with considerable chances for inclusion.

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Core Contributors

DAO Core Contributors have emerged organically over the past few years, evolving from highly engaged groups like the dGC and dLeaders. This role, never formally introduced, will be officially recognized with the passing of this proposal.

The SSV Foundation will invite and facilitate the onboarding of Core Contributors, holding the discretion to revoke this status. The DAO retains the right to nominate Core Contributors or override any Foundation decisions through proposals. Nominations and revocations will be announced on the SSV Governance Forum.

Core Contributors will receive the following benefits:

  • @ssv.network mail address, identity, and access to dedicated communication channels
  • Invitation to SSV DAO Meetups and partial expenses coverage
  • Invite to the DAO All-Hands calls
  • Exclusive invites to Events and other benefits
  • Swag welcome package curated by the SSV Foundation

Everyone who currently has the Core Contributor role on the SSV Discord server is automatically legitimized. In addition to the existing Core Contributors, all SSV Divers shall be added to the Core Contributor role, too. This doesn’t alter their status as SSV Divers, and the program remains unaffected by this decision.

Committee Revisions

The SSV DAO is proactively preparing for the launch of SSV 2.0 by streamlining existing committees that have successfully fulfilled their initial mandates. These committees will transition to a lean operational mode, focusing on developing future strategies. To navigate current market conditions effectively, committee composition and compensation will be adjusted, ensuring that a powerful core team remains to plan for future initiatives. Additionally, the DAO is clarifying roles and dissolving outdated programs and working groups from its early stages. To enhance transparency, dedicated voting spaces on Snapshot will be introduced for each committee, making the decision-making process more accessible and accountable.

Verified Operator Committee

The Verified Operator Committee’s composition will be reduced to four compensated members, including secretary services from the SSV Foundation and a dedicated contributor from SSV Labs.

  • @GBeast (Lead Link, Facilitator)
  • @metanull (Member)
  • @Hackworth (Member)
  • @BumpyTale (Member)
  • SSV Foundation (FSS) (Secretary, unpaid)
  • SSV Labs (Member, unpaid)

FSS shall participate with full voting rights as an unpaid committee member.

The baseline composition of $1,500/month per remaining committee member is reduced to $1,000/month for the nominated lead link and $750/month for regular committee members.

The granted budget in DIP-XX shall be revoked. Any future demand from the VOC should either be requested from the Grants Program’s Budget according to its terms or presented as a dedicated proposal.

Grants Committee

The Grants Committee’s composition will be reduced to four compensated members, including secretary services from the SSV Foundation and a dedicated contributor from SSV Labs.

FSS shall participate in the governance with full voting right as a non-payable committee member.

The baseline composition of $1,500/month per remaining committee member is reduced to $1,000/month for the nominated lead link and $750/month for regular committee members.

Dedicated Committee Voting Spaces

Previously, tracking votes within existing committees has been challenging, leading to a lack of transparency for the broader community. To address this, dedicated off-chain voting spaces are being introduced on snapshot. Voting in these spaces will adhere to the DAO-approved committee guidelines, ensuring a more transparent and accountable process. The following spaces will be generated initially, with more to follow as additional organs are created:

  • msig.ssvnetwork.eth
  • vo.ssvnetwork.eth
  • grants.ssvnetwork.eth

Dissolving the dGC, dLeader, and dMarketing programs

The DAO genesis committee, dLeaders, and dMarketing committees shall be officially dissolved immediately, and a cleanup across the various documentations and tooling shall be conducted. Leftover budget from any of these past activities shall be immediately revoked. This effectively dismantles these entities within the DAO and reallocates any funds previously assigned to them back to the DAO Treasury, awaiting further DAO proposal allocation.

DAO Budget Revision

The SSV DAO recently passed DIP-26 and successfully implemented its particulars. However, market conditions aren’t in favor of an aggressive budget, and the budget burn down is less linear than expected and more infrequent. Therefore, the following adjustments to the Mechanics and Budget are proposed:

Mechanics

The Operational Budget Track under DIP-26 outlined the requirement of the MC to mint the Monthly Budget in every First Scheduled Batch. With this in mind, the changes to DIP-26 include:

  1. The Monthly Budget will continue to be minted only with regard to half of the Monthly Budget intended for the sale by service providers chosen by the Foundation.

For transparency to the ssv.network DAO community, the Foundation has exercised its discretion to stop selling SSV by virtue of the Reserve and Operational Budget Tracks Common Provisions of DIP-26, under point 2.

Budget

[DIP-26] outlined Projected Annual Expenses and Projected Monthly Expenses. These projections were based on projected expenses for the DAO in [DIP-26]. In light of difficult market conditions, the DAO proposes that some of these expenses be removed:

  1. The total budget for all Committees (GC, VOC, MSIG, including MoC) is hereby reduced to $238,000 (from $300,000) for 2025.
  2. The total grants budget is hereby reduced to $500,000 (from $1,000,000) for 2025.
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@fod @spookyg @derfredy @h.m.23-0neinfra @markoinether @axblox @flo @thomasblock @yuting @damon @lemmagov @llifezou @blockside @sigmaprime @kenway @hashkeygov @Ethernodes @p2pgov @chainupgov @kiln @Allnodes

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I’d like to express my concerns regarding the proposed compensation changes for DAO core contributors, particularly with respect to the Verified Operator Committee and the Grants Committee, where I’m an active member.

While I fully understand that the DAO is currently under financial pressure and must reduce spending, I believe that this proposal risks undermining the DAO’s operational capacity by slashing contributor compensation too drastically.

Under the previous $1,500/month compensation, members of the Grants Committee typically committed around 4 hours per week. Reducing compensation by 50% will likely reduce the available time and commitment proportionally. However, this doesn’t match the workload expectations. For instance, we already reserve 4 weekly slots for meetings with grantees, plus 1 hour biweekly for committee meetings. While not all grantee slots have been filled recently, committee members must still keep this time open, and with the implementation of a new grant strategy, we can expect increased demand for these meetings.

This means that even with reduced compensation, contributors will still be expected to commit the same or similar time to meetings — leaving little to no bandwidth for proposal evaluations, strategic planning, or other vital tasks.

It’s also important to note that contributors are compensated in SSV, exposing them to token volatility. The current system uses a 30-day TWAP (time-weighted average price), calculated at the beginning of each month. In recent months, this has already led to payouts that are up to 50% below the nominal $1,500. Given market conditions and the typical underperformance of altcoins outside of bull phases, it is likely that this TWAP method will continue to undervalue compensation.

Additionally, a $10 price floor is applied to all SSV payouts. With the SSV token trading at approximately $6.50 at the time of writing, this means contributors are currently receiving around 35% less than the intended value. Combined with the TWAP pricing mechanism, the proposed base pay cuts could result in actual compensation being reduced by as much as 75% — or even more if the SSV price continues to fall further below the $10 floor.

Moreover, it’s hard to reconcile these deep cuts with other budget decisions. For example, if DIP-31 is passed, the DAO will allocate 15% of the current SSV supply to SSV Labs — a move that has received broad support. If the rationale for cutting core contributor pay is financial prudence, then such large allocations should face similar scrutiny. Why are DAO contributors — the lifeblood of day-to-day operations — being held to a different standard?

Most DAO contributors are professionals who bring valuable expertise that could be deployed elsewhere for better pay. Halving compensation (or even effectively quartering it, as outlined above) risks reducing the DAO’s ability to attract and retain qualified contributors, ultimately to the DAO’s own detriment.

I urge the community to reconsider the depth of these compensation cuts and to strike a better balance between financial sustainability and operational effectiveness.

1 Like
4

Hello @BumpyTale,

Thank you very much for your message! These are valid points, and alternatives can be considered. I’ll share more context and corrections, so everyone has all the information.

Under the previous $1,500/month compensation, members of the Grants Committee typically committed around 4 hours per week. Reducing compensation by 50% will likely reduce the available time and commitment proportionally.

DIP-32 introduces more support from the SSV Foundation. For instance, the SSV Foundation has already taken over most of the logistical work within the Grants Committee, which otherwise would have been part of the job description. The expected time commitment for a committee member is 24 hours/month, not 16 hours/month. In general, the committees shall work less logistically and more consultatively, unless one of the committees presents a new mandate that requires additional efforts and is more time-consuming. This shall be presented as a proposal to the DAO and can have additional compensation tied to it.

It’s also important to note that contributors are compensated in SSV, exposing them to token volatility. The current system uses a 30-day TWAP (time-weighted average price), calculated at the beginning of each month. In recent months, this has already led to payouts that are up to 50% below the nominal $1,500. Given market conditions and the typical underperformance of altcoins outside of bull phases, it is likely that this TWAP method will continue to undervalue compensation.

This is correct, and a 30-day mvg. avg, is the standard for DAO compensation, and works in both directions. We’ve seen instances of upside, too. One can observe this in the DAO Treasury Sheet and compare average prices to the daily price. A shorter average price could be selected. However, from a perspective of long-time contributors, this should even out. A more detailed analysis could be conducted if necessary.

Additionally, a $10 price floor is applied to all SSV payouts. With the SSV token trading at approximately $6.50 at the time of writing, this means contributors are currently receiving around 35% less than the intended value. Combined with the TWAP pricing mechanism, the proposed base pay cuts could result in actual compensation being reduced by as much as 75% — or even more if the SSV price continues to fall further below the $10 floor.

This is incorrect. The $10 price floor doesn’t apply to committee members, and doesn’t have any cross-effect with the above-mentioned mvg. avg., making the current compensation model very generous and “independent” of market conditions, which might be considered a plus.

Moreover, it’s hard to reconcile these deep cuts with other budget decisions. For example, if DIP-31 is passed, the DAO will allocate 15% of the current SSV supply to SSV Labs — a move that has received broad support. If the rationale for cutting core contributor pay is financial prudence, then such large allocations should face similar scrutiny. Why are DAO contributors — the lifeblood of day-to-day operations — being held to a different standard?

Please note that this has been done, and as DIP-31 and DIP-35 outline, the actual costs are much higher than the DAO’s share. The working group has negotiated this several times in the interests of all parties. In addition to that, vesting has been introduced in DIP-31 and budget discretion for the SSV Foundation in DIP-35.

The SSV Foundation has many of its expenses also tied to the price of SSV (floor prices) and therefore automatically adjusts with an impact on its personnel. The above-mentioned transparency policy would allow the community to get insights into the exact impact.

Halving compensation (or even effectively quartering it, as outlined above) risks reducing the DAO’s ability to attract and retain qualified contributors, ultimately to the DAO’s own detriment.

Given the corrected context above, the reduction for normal members is 50% and ~35% for the lead links. Given that the time commitment is relaxed (as to reflect the working reality over the last years), the reduction is even less. A more detailed analysis could be conducted if necessary.

Thank you!

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Thank you for the thoughtful and detailed response — I appreciate the openness to dialogue and the clarifications provided.

On workload expectations:
I acknowledge the point that the Foundation has taken over a significant portion of the logistical responsibilities. That certainly reduces the administrative burden. However, the assumption that this leads to a relaxed time commitment may not hold over time — especially with the new grants strategy being rolled out. If the 4 weekly grantee call slots begin to fill (as expected), much of the saved logistical time may be offset by higher engagement with grantees, strategic evaluation, and proposal follow-up. A clearer definition of committee responsibilities under this new model might help align expectations.

On compensation volatility:
Thanks for clarifying that the $10 price floor does not apply to committee members — that is helpful to know. That said, being fully exposed to SSV’s price movements (via TWAP) while also facing a nominal pay cut still introduces significant volatility in real terms. While long-term averaging may work in theory, in practice many contributors budget and plan monthly, not annually. If SSV continues to trade far below its historical levels, actual compensation could remain depressed for extended periods, potentially undermining contributor stability and retention.

On economic viability and professionalism:
In its current form, the revised compensation structure appears more suitable for hobbyists rather than professionals. For instance, I am contributing to the DAO in my capacity as an employee of Blockshard, an organization based in Switzerland — a high-cost country where employers are required to pay social contributions such as unemployment insurance, accident insurance, and retirement benefits. Under the new regime, the level of compensation offered does not cover these costs, making my contribution economically unsustainable in the long term.

More broadly, as you outlined, the DAO expects consultation services from its core contributors. However, with compensation set at a level that cannot realistically attract or retain professionals with domain expertise, the DAO will — by design — shift toward working primarily with hobbyists. While hobbyist contributions are certainly valuable, this shift may come at the expense of depth, continuity, and strategic capacity in DAO operations.

On budget framing and fairness:
I understand that negotiations around DIP-31 and DIP-35 were extensive and that concessions were made. My point wasn’t to question the need for those allocations, but rather to highlight the contrast in how compensation changes are framed. The narrative around contributor pay is presented as “austerity for sustainability,” while other large expenditures (however justified) aren’t always communicated with the same lens of restraint. A shared commitment to transparent cost–benefit analysis across all DAO expenses might help reduce that perceived imbalance and foster trust.

On next steps:
I welcome the suggestion to conduct a more detailed analysis. Whether it’s reviewing workload expectations, compensation benchmarks, or the long-term impact of SSV-based payouts, such an exercise could bring much-needed clarity and alignment for all involved.

Thanks again for engaging on this — I look forward to further discussion.

2 Likes
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I want to raise a separate but critical concern regarding the following section of DIP-32:

The SSV Foundation will invite and facilitate the onboarding of Core Contributors, holding the discretion to revoke this status. The DAO retains the right to nominate Core Contributors or override any Foundation decisions through proposals. Nominations and revocations will be announced on the SSV Governance Forum.

This proposal effectively delegates one of the DAO’s most essential functions - the authority to hire and remove core contributors - to a small, centralised entity. In practice, this means a team of two individuals will hold operational control over contributor selection for a protocol securing over $6 billion in staked value.

Hiring and firing are not just administrative tasks. They are fundamental acts of governance. They determine who holds influence, who shapes strategy, and ultimately, the DAO’s long-term direction. In most organisations - decentralised or not - the control over human resources is among the most powerful levers of control.

I am deeply concerned that this setup introduces:

  • A central bottleneck: With such a small group making contributor decisions, there’s a significant risk of over-centralisation - even if this is not the intention.
  • Lack of process transparency: How will decisions be made? What are the evaluation criteria? Will revocations require justification or DAO review?
  • Risk of personal bias: Even well-meaning individuals are subject to unconscious biases. Concentrating this authority in such a limited circle invites risks of favoritism, conflicts of interest, or chilling effects on dissent.
  • Governance imbalance: While the DAO retains override rights in theory, such processes are slow, politically challenging, and rarely used. In practice, the Foundation will become the de facto gatekeeper of DAO contributor status.

This proposal represents a governance shift. While framed as an operational improvement, it effectively moves power away from token holders and toward an unelected group. I don’t question the capacity or integrity of the current Foundation team - I am raising a structural concern about the long-term health of the DAO.

To preserve decentralisation and accountability, I would strongly advocate for:

  • DAO ratification of all onboarding and removal of core contributors.
  • Clear, transparent contributor mandates and evaluation criteria.
  • A multi-party committee (including elected tokenholder reps) for contributor decisions, rather than sole Foundation discretion.

Let’s not unintentionally create a governance structure where critical decisions rest in too few hands. This DAO has grown too large, and too important, to take that risk.

3 Likes
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In general, we are supportive of this proposal, as we recognize that with the maturation of SSV and the upcoming launch of SSV 2.0, it is essential for the DAO and its committees to evolve accordingly. Nevertheless, we would like to raise two points for further clarification and consideration:

1. Committee Compensation — Further Clarification Requested

While we understand the rationale behind reducing compensation for the Grants and Verified Operator Committees, we believe this adjustment should be carefully considered, given the strategic importance of both groups for the continued stability and development of the network.

Both committees play a crucial role:

  • Verified Operator Committee ensures network reliability and operator integrity.
  • Grants Committee is essential for nurturing the ecosystem and supporting growth through funding initiatives.

Given these responsibilities, it is important that members remain properly incentivized and do not feel undervalued. Therefore, we would like to better understand the justification for the proposed reduction. Specifically:

  • Has the workload decreased substantially over recent months?
  • For example, has the number of grant applications dropped significantly (e.g. by ~50%) to warrant the adjustment?

Additional data or context on committee workload would be appreciated before supporting this reduction fully.

2. Governance Temp-Checks — Suggested Adjustment

While the introduction of Temp-Checks aims to improve community engagement and surface sentiment early, we are concerned that it may introduce an unnecessary additional layer in the governance process.

In practice, contributors already engage the community before formalizing proposals. As such, adding an explicit Temp-Check step could slow down governance and create friction for active contributors.

We suggest the following alternative:

  • Integrate the Temp-Check directly into the forum proposal itself.
  • This would allow proposers to gather community sentiment and feedback in parallel with the formal discussion process.
  • If feedback during this phase is negative, the proposal can be paused or reworked before advancing to Snapshot voting.

This approach retains the benefit of gauging sentiment while reducing process overhead and accelerating productive discussions.

Overall, we welcome the efforts to improve transparency, efficiency, and alignment within the DAO.

2 Likes
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I agree to cut budget. recent budget is too high.

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As an SSV Diver, I agree with @BumpyTale on this. The part where the SSV Foundation has full discretion to onboard and revoke Core Contributors feels off. If we’re going to be officially recognized in that role, it should be reviewed, approved and maintained exclusively by the DAO. That’s how we preserve true decentralization.

I also think my fellow SSV Divers and I would be more than happy to open a proposal (or even do it as part of this one), present ourselves, share the contributions we’ve made to the SSV community and let SSV token holders decide through a vote whether we should be recognized as Core Contributors.

3 Likes
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I support this proposal, and I disagree with most of the comments made thus far on staffing.

The Foundation’s power to hire/fire/reduce:

I think having the Foundation manage these staffing decisions makes sense. I think it’s a poor solution to have the DAO vote on every decision… We used to do it this way, and it’s simply not practical for many reasons, especially now that we have many more people. Having a centralized entity make non-critical staffing decisions seems like a very standard practice.

Regarding the concern for preserving decentralization, the DAO always has the ability to override the Foundation with a vote, correct? So I think we have a power-limiting control in place already that can be used at any time.

Contributor compensation:

Regarding reducing DAO labor expenses in general, I think it’s reasonable to do so, since our overall goal is to cut costs. However, I think we should be sensitive to the realities of staffing, and both sides should probably make some compromises in the effort to retain everyone.

Giving a longer-term perspective, the DAO has always done its best to compensate contributors, including through mechanisms like retroactive pay and grants. I think the reality has been that if you work hard and add value, you will be compensated for your time, even if it’s not immediate. I don’t think this has changed.

Regarding the changes to committee salaries, I see the intention of this as a reduction of hours worked, not a reduction in intended pay rate. Each committee/role should simply estimate their hourly rate and ensure it’s in a reasonable range. Note that the salaries weren’t set that intelligently in the first place because of initial uncertainty… Now we have more information to revisit this.

With our “core contributors”, I don’t think the intention is to staff a large team of salaried employees in long-term static roles (with a few exceptions, like the m-sig). Rather, I think most of our work has been closer to a contract-based structure and should mirror the value added/work done for the DAO’s needs at that time.

Maybe a reasonable compromise to offset committee pay adjustments and handle Divers is for core contributors to get a small salary ($250 / month?) for showing up regularly as dedicated “staff” (adding to the community, providing basic help, and searching/waiting for opportunities where greater value can be added). Then as DAO needs arise (as with committees), we will have a pool of people available. Would this be sufficient for everyone to “show up” and have some sense of responsibility? @AXBLOX @BumpyTale @Ethernodes

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Thanks for sharing your view - but I want to state clearly that I strongly disagree with this position.

DIP-32 doesn’t simply delegate staffing for efficiency - it grants the Foundation default authority over contributor onboarding and offboarding, a power that goes beyond its current mandate and conflicts with the Foundation’s own bylaws.

The proposal states:

The SSV Foundation will invite and facilitate the onboarding of Core Contributors, holding the discretion to revoke this status.

This hands unilateral decision-making power to a small, unelected group. It’s not limited to logistical support or facilitation - it gives the Foundation final say on who participates in DAO operations. This is not a neutral administrative function; it’s a governance power, and a significant one.

Compare this to what the Foundation’s bylaws say:

The Foundation and its personnel are obligated to comply with the instruction of any DAO committee, committee member or other person or entity empowered by the DAO to instruct the Foundation. Such instructions might pertain but not be limited to, hiring and terminating employee, contractor or service agreements […] (p.3)

In other words, the Foundation is meant to execute staffing decisions based on DAO instruction - not own those decisions.

As for the override mechanism: yes, the DAO technically retains override rights, but this is not a meaningful safeguard. Overrides are rarely used in practice. They require formal proposals, social coordination, and political will - all of which create high barriers to reversal. Once authority is granted by default, it tends to remain that way.

This isn’t about operational convenience. It’s about preserving DAO sovereignty, as clearly intended in the Foundation’s own governing framework. A centralised default on staffing - even if well-intentioned - introduces risks of favoritism, bias, and chilling effects on dissent. It also sets a precedent that erodes the role of token holders in shaping the DAO’s long-term direction.

I strongly urge reconsideration of this aspect of DIP-32 and recommend exploring governance structures that ensure operational efficiency without stripping the DAO of its authority.

3 Likes
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Thanks, I see your point and agree that changes are needed for this proposal.

However, I don’t think having the DAO vote on every single staffing change is feasible. I don’t know what the solution is, but I don’t think that’s a realistic option, for many reasons. Delegation seems necessary in some form (with fail-safes).

1 Like
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I really appreciate the open debate happening here. For me, that’s exactly what this forum is for: exchanging ideas, challenging each other, exploring different paths and finding common ground that the majority can stand behind.

@fod about this:

I don’t think there’s been that much staff turnover in the DAO, just a few role changes or new nominations here and there, but to be fair, some of them have already been handled pretty smoothly with proper votes from SSV holders. For instance, some recent role nominations or extensions that were voted on by SSV holders:

https://snapshot.box/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0xdefc70549bce3f0b6838c0e3402ce3716452203feba7da32ac0874a680a5e0d8

https://snapshot.box/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0xf6229bfee3e344f74c6e4a284a04991a3aae7a13ac4c91022cd377fd6469458c

https://snapshot.box/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0x21345aeb034cb111fd64252c13c46649336da5d9b2d767c4301389fb8f55c420

To simplify the process, we could bundle multiple Core Contributor nominations, extensions, or offboardings into one proposal. I want to reiterate that I agree with @BumpyTale on the importance of preserving DAO sovereignty when it comes to onboarding and offboarding Core Contributors.

About this:

I think that sounds like a solid compromise, it helps balance out the committee pay changes while keeping everyone motivated to stay involved. Compensation talk is always tricky, but let’s be real, we all have bills to pay and things aren’t exactly rosy out there economically. I think it’s reasonable to find a balance, providing fair financial support to Core Contributors while staying mindful of the DAO’s tight budget.

As an SSV Diver, I’m here because I genuinely love what we’re building, the protocol is fascinating and SSV 2.0 with the bApps chain coming soon feels like it could be a real game changer in the ETH staking space. Honestly, it feels like I picked the right team!

Getting the DAO Core Contributor status would be an honor! That said, we do live in a capitalist world and I won’t lie, I was a bit disappointed, I was hoping the recognition might come with a compensation that matches the value I try to bring to the protocol and community. That being said, I still feel lucky to be part of this journey and I’m only sharing this now since @fod opened up the topic.

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Thanks for your thoughts. I agree that we should ensure that the DAO has strong and practical control over staffing. I’m just skeptical about the logistics if we don’t figure out a way to delegate it, and I think it deserves caution. Personally, I think we can come up with a system, like maybe having committee leads be appointed by DAO vote, then the rest of the committees appointed internally… I don’t know. But I’ll just say one last set of things and then go away :slightly_smiling_face:

The reasons are:

-Historically speaking, the community hasn’t ever had the time or desire to thoroughly keep up with who each of us are and what we do on a daily basis. It’s hard enough for us to do this internally, and we’re paid.

-I don’t think it’s wise to have all staffing decided by vote from (mostly) people that don’t have a clear view of day-to-day operations and haven’t actually worked in the trenches with any of our teams. It’s difficult to understand our logistics, our actual problems/tasks, and our functional strengths/weaknesses.

-We did an experiment in the past using Coordinape, which is a community-driven compensation platform, where everyone would vote on how much value each person added every month. Then compensation was based on those votes. It didn’t work well, mainly because it’s just really hard to keep up with everyone’s work, especially part-time, and especially considering many things aren’t even observable. Having EVERYONE responsible for staffing adds that work for EVERYONE, and the system only functions well if that work is actually done.

-Adding up everything, we have a lot of positions to manage, and changes seem somewhat frequent. I think it hasn’t seemed terrible because most of the changes have been done internally by committees without full DAO votes.

-Although we have had votes about staffing in the past, these have been people with clear roles and externally-visible contributions. Not everyone has that luxury, which can make it difficult to regularly show and motivate your work to others. This was another lesson from Coordinape. And also, if I remember correctly, even getting some of those mentioned proposals to pass was difficult.

-We don’t want everyone to have to worry about their public perception, especially for some roles that shouldn’t care about such things.

However, playing Devil’s Advocate with myself:

-The increased maturity of the DAO and the new delegate program might have changed our community dynamic a lot. We used to struggle for voting activity and engagement, but that might be behind us now. Maybe we have enough people that are willing to volunteer their time to follow everything and discuss in detail?

-Voters could theoretically just base their opinions on the opinions of contributors that do understand the daily work and people. Again, historically, these discussions haven’t been adequate, but maybe we can improve this.

-Most us have been working together long enough that internal knowledge of one another seems much better than it was before. We might not struggle to evaluate ourselves like we did in the past.

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In our opinion, the DAO needs to continue evolving alongside the protocol. SSV now secures over 100,000 validators and is actively progressing towards SSV 2.0 and application-based layers.

We agree that the protocol itself must remain as decentralized as possible — especially for core matters. However, as the ecosystem grows, it becomes necessary for certain actors to take on leadership roles. In this case, we believe that SSV Foundation and SSV Labs should keep into that responsibility. Operational tasks, such as onboarding and offboarding core community members, should fall within their area of influence without requiring extensive DAO-level decision-making.

If no entity is empowered to take ownership of these tasks, the protocol risks wasting valuable time and effort on non-core issues — a scenario that is not ideal for the next phases of SSV’s growth.

That said, governance should always retain the ability to review, revoke, or adjust practices that are considered abusive or misaligned with the protocol’s goals. Still, we do not believe core contributors should be burdened with unnecessary additional workload.

On the topic of payments, we support fair compensation based on the hours sub-committee members dedicate to their roles. Therefore, we do not agree with reducing fees outright, but rather recommend aligning compensation with the actual level of commitment and contribution.

Regarding the SSV-Divers compensation proposal, we believe the suggested benefits package should be sufficient.

By the way — love to see the SSV community so actively engaged!

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For me, it is very normal and efficient for the SSV Foundation to hire employees and contractors. They have a good understanding of what kind of talent is needed to better promote the development of the SSV project.

What I am a bit confused about in this proposal is that it mentions that the SSV Foundation will invite and facilitate core contributors’ onboarding, which sounds like a role for a DAO organization. I don’t understand the reasoning behind this approach.

Additionally, what kind of organization are these core contributors part of, and what are their obligations? Since core contributors seem to be unpaid, appearing as “volunteering out of love,” how can we effectively manage this organization and leverage its diverse advantages?

Overall, these are indeed challenging times; SSV has supported 100k Ethereum validators. We need to motivate talented individuals from various fields to contribute to this project, especially during this critical period for ssv2.0. If DAO members voluntarily reduce their salaries, then I have nothing more to say; however, if it’s an involuntary pay cut now, I still have significant concerns about future developments—worrying about losing key talents while grant budgets also decrease significantly—and whether it might adversely affect ssv2.0’s ecosystem development. I’m increasingly feeling that we need some incentive plans with delayed compensation at this special moment.

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I agree with this take. Yes, we want to be sure the fox isn’t guarding the hen-house; and yes, we still need to be able to make efficient hiring decisions.

As for removing some committees and reducing the compensation of others: That all looks directionally correct to me.

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