Thanks for the thoughts, Alon. I’m open to alternatives if there are viable ones.
Using the IMP has the potential to be a temporary band-aid for fee adjustments, since it can be handled off-chain.
Allow operators to adjust their fees more quickly (with DAO-controlled parameters).
This seems challenging without moving forward with a “full solution”. Don’t forget that addressing validator consolidations (pricing in terms of ETH staked, not validator count) was another required item for this to be meaningful. This was part of the recent Temp Check, and it seems like it’s not easy/quick.
[edit: See comment below… maybe everything can just be pulled into IMP deductions, including validator consolidations, and we can handle everything how we want there? I also missed this relevant post from Alon until now: Solving Max Effective Cluster Balance with SSV Staking]
Do you mean something like allowing operators to set fees in terms of % ETH rewards but still having it denominated in SSV? Still need to be cautious about SSV volatility (customer hassle, liquidation risk, malicious operators, etc.), but I think this could at least be a step in the right direction. Might not even be worth the effort without validator consolidations fixed though.
Moving everything to ETH fees (as % of ETH rewards, using ETH staked for calculation) seemed like the agreed upon solution. This was also part of the Temp Check that passed. Any hope to simply expedite all of this?
Offset previous losses via the IMP for the users who stake.
I assume you mean give some portion of the IMP to operators (at the expense of stakers)? If so, this might work, as it’s “fair” for most involved… stakers that have been getting cheap fees would pay to make up for the discount. But there are disadvantages, mainly the inequality between operators. Some operators will get far too much, and some almost nothing. Also unknown response from the stakers for losing income, especially new ones that didn’t get the cheap fees.
My intention was proposing this as a minimal subsidy to reimburse operating losses, not reimbursing lost income potential. I guess it depends on our goal… if it is to preserve our entire verified operator set (my intention), this solution won’t save all of them.
This feels like a fairer approach than placing the entire “cost” on SSV holders.
How about we soften the impact by stretching out the payments over 12 months or something, instead of it being immediate?
I’m personally still leaning towards just minting and paying in some form… simple, clean, fair, no overhead, gives us time to fix everything properly without “band-aids”. Obviously we want to be frugal, but ~$200k is comparatively small (~$17k per month over 12 months).
I understand that it’s not ideal, and I too have been resisting this option until now. But the current situation is one where the DAO deprioritized fixing operator issues and “borrowed” from them for a long time. We waited until it became a large problem, and the “bill” is coming due.