[DIP-49] Network Fee Ratio Maximum

Proposals
1

[DIP-49] Network Fee Ratio Maximum

Summary

This proposal introduces a max limit to the ETH/SSV price ratio within the current formula of the Network Fee. The max limit for the said ratio ETHSSVmax shall be set at 700.

Motivation

This proposal sets a max limit to the ETH/SSV prices ratio within the formula that is used to determine the network fee, thus stabilizing fee economics by aligning the Network Fee relative to potential incentives. While the Incentivized Mainnet Program (IMP) applies an SSV floor price and inflation-cap limitations in its rewards logic to preserve sustainable network economics, the Network Fee has been fully subject to volatility of prices. This misalignment, almost random at times, leads to substantial uncertainties among stakers utilizing the SSV Network and undermines the very goals the IMP serves. With the goal of preserving market dominance at this stage of growth in mind, the DAO should focus its efforts and resources on retaining current users and acquiring new ones.

By way of example, the following graphs elucidate this mechanic:

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image956Ă—120 9.56 KB

Mechanics

Network Fee Formula Adjustment

If this proposal were to pass, the DAO Multi-Sig Committee (hereinafter: “MC”) will implement the ETHSSVmax of 700 and use it for all subsequent Deviation Checks when calculating the Network Fee. The formula below is for reference only, indicating how this adjusted formula should be:

image

The MC shall also recalculate and replace the December 2025 Deviation Check, by implementing the max limit ratio detailed in this proposal.

Operational Provisions

If this proposal were to pass the MC will execute the Network Fee update in its Second Scheduled Monthly batch starting December 2025, as defined by the DAO Contributor: Proposal for Engagement as the DAO’s Master of Coin DAO proposal.

Other than the abovementioned introduction of the max limit price of ETH/SSV ratio into the Network Fee formula, all previous variables, proposals, and mechanisms shall remain unchanged and shall continue to apply to the Network Fee formula and its setting process.

3 Likes
DAO Controlled Network Parameters Feed [Evergreen]
2

This proposal is a solid move because it fixes an important issue we have today: Network fee jumping around just because ETH/SSV pricing swings. By capping the ratio at 700, the network becomes more predictable for stakers while SSV scale. It’s a simple stabilization measure, not the ultimate solution but an effective temporary fix that keeps things fair and steady until a more comprehensive model can be introduced.

1 Like
3

We agree that introducing a cap on the ETH/SSV ratio is a pragmatic step for stabilizing the Network Fee in the current market environment. The volatility-driven swings in fee levels have indeed created unnecessary uncertainty for operators and stakers, so applying a ceiling at 700 helps ensure the fee mechanism remains predictable and aligned with IMP’s incentive design.

While this isn’t the long-term end state for fee modeling, it’s a reasonable interim adjustment that protects user experience and supports network growth. A more holistic economic framework can be explored once the ecosystem matures further, but this proposal provides immediate value without adding complexity.

Overall, I’m supportive of this change as a practical and timely improvement.

2 Likes
4

Although this isn’t ideal because it ultimately decreases DAO revenue, I think it’s an effective band-aid solution until the network changes its fee structure to be ETH-based. Fee volatility is a major problem for stakers.

2 Likes
5

Voting is now live :vertical_traffic_light:

https://snapshot.org/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0x5300de7fd0df8c07b06b1e4ad71bdf036945b26787b0157d70ab80fee3ad4126

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6

I support DIP-49.

The main benefit is cost predictability. Without a cap, Network Fees can spike simply due to SSV price volatility, which creates unnecessary uncertainty for stakers and operators. Adding a reasonable ETH/SSV cap keeps fees stable without changing the core model.

This is a practical, user-first improvement that supports long-term adoption.

1 Like