[DIP-34] Incentivized Mainnet Program - Revision #3

Proposal Summary

This proposal introduces a comprehensive update to the Incentivized Mainnet Program (hereinafter: “IMP”), including a new tiered reward structure, revised eligibility conditions, and adjustments to the distribution mechanics used to calculate and allocate rewards.

In addition to these program-wide changes, this proposal outlines how the IMP will transition from a per-validator structure to a validator effective balance-based structure to ensure compatibility with Ethereum’s upcoming Pectra hard fork.

The original IMP proposal and terms will remain valid for aspects not amended by this proposal.

Motivation

The motivation for this proposal is twofold:

  1. To support the continued growth of the SSV Network in validator count and ETH staked. As the network nears the upper bounds of the currently defined program tiers, new tiers are required to continue incentivizing our projected growth and participation at scale.

  2. To ensure compatibility with Ethereum’s Pectra hard-fork, which increases the maximum validator effective balance - enabling stakers to run validators with up to 2048 ETH balance and consolidate existing validators. To reflect this change, the program must transition from a validator-based to an effective balance-based structure, which impacts how tiers are assigned and rewards are calculated.

Proposal Particulars

  1. Previous Proposals
  2. Proposed Revisions
    1. Effectiveness of Proposed Revisions
    2. Mechanics
    3. Refactored Reward Tiers
    4. Eligibility Updates
      1. Validator Performance Threshold
      2. Reward Address Attribution
    5. Reward Calculation
    6. Pectra Compatibility Updates
      1. Refactored Reward Tiers
      2. Reward Calculation
        1. Network Fee Adjustment Under Pectra
    7. Appendix: Historical Contracts Attribution Mapping

Previous Proposals

The Incentivized Mainnet Program was passed by the ssv.network DAO on November 6th, 2023 with the proposal Incentivized Mainnet Program.

Certain provisions of this proposal were amended on the 18th of June 2024 with [DIP-18] Incentivized Mainnet Program - Revision (hereinafter referred to as: “DIP-18”). These amendments include:

  1. duration of the IMP has been extended;
  2. the reward tiers were expanded to include a higher total number of validators and the respective APR boost for the new validators
  3. the inclusion of SAFE multisig wallets into eligible participants of the IMP.
  4. the distribution time of the rewards of the IMP to the 15th of the following month for the previous month at the latest.

Certain provisions of the IMP proposal were added on the 15th of September, 2024 with [DIP-22]: Incentivized Mainnet Exception for Lido SimpleDVT Participants (hereinafter referred to as: “DIP-22”). These additions include:

  1. a new distribution contract to help with the distribution of the IMP rewards to SimpleDVT participants.
  2. a set of calculations to correctly track user participation and eligibility.
  3. a set of calculations for the payment of IMP rewards to SimpleDVT participants.
  4. a dedicated page for the claiming IMP rewards.
  5. Tying the effectiveness of the SimpleDVT program to the duration of either the end of the IMP or the Lido SimpleDVT program.

Certain provisions of the IMP proposal were added and amended on the 26th of December, 2024 with [DIP-27] Incentivized Mainnet Program - Revision #2 (hereinafter referred to as: “DIP 27”). These additions and amendments include:

  1. new way of calculating rounds for reward distribution.
  2. extending the IMP program until December 31st 2025.
  3. a new 1 million SSV allocated.

Certain provisions of the IMP proposal were added on the 31st of March 2025, with [DIP-30] Incentivized Mainnet Exception for Lido CSM/SDVT Participants and Updated Terms for IMP. These additions and amendments include:

  1. a distribution of IMP rewards to CSM participants.
  2. funding of additional runway for SDVT clusters
  3. the introduction of ToS to the IMP
  4. sanction screening

Proposed Revisions

Effectiveness of Proposed Revisions

Due to the time sensitive nature of all Proposed Revisions it is important to split from which distribution will certain Proposed Revisions become effective. This schedule can be found below.

  1. Refactored Reward Tiers - April Distribution
  2. Other Proposed Revisions - May Distribution

Pectra related provisions will become effective in the round, following the round in which Pectra is deployed and functioning on the Ethereum Mainnet.

Mechanics

Refactored Reward Tiers

The program tiers and corresponding APR boosts as set out in DIP-27, will be restructured according to a new tiered rewards system:

Tier (Validators) APR Boost
45001 - 100000 10%
100001 - 125000 7.5%
125001 - 150000 6%
150001 - 175000 5%
175001 - 200000 3.5%

Eligibility Updates

Validator Performance Threshold

The validator performance threshold (previously set at 90%) will be updated to 95% of daily Beacon Chain attestations in a given reward round.

Reward Address Attribution

Validator rewards will now be attributed exclusively to the address that registered the validator (the “Reward Address”), regardless of whether it is an EOA or smart contract. This change simplifies the mechanism and replaces the previous logic introduced in:

Exceptions:

  1. Validators participating in Lido’s SimpleDVT or CSM modules will continue to have rewards allocated to the distributor contracts as defined in DIP-22 and DIP-30 proposals.

  2. Smart contracts that registered validators before this proposal will continue to have rewards attributed to their deployer address, as listed in the Appendix.

All new smart contracts registering validators from this point forward will receive rewards directly to the contract address and are expected to implement their own mechanisms to manage them.

Reward Calculation

The ETH and SSV price averages, which are used to calculate the APR boost for each tier in a given reward cycle, will now be based on the current cycle’s data, in contrast to the prior month’s averages, which were used until now.

Pectra Compatibility Updates

Ethereum’s Pectra upgrade will enable validators to increase their maximum effective balance from 32 ETH up to 2048 ETH. This unlocks the ability to consolidate multiple existing validators into a single validator with higher effective balance, significantly improving efficiency and cost-effectiveness for operators.

To support this shift, the IMP will move from a per-validator model to an effective balance-based model for calculating rewards and tier placement.

Refactored Reward Tiers

The program tiers and corresponding APR boosts will be restructured according to a new effective balance-based tiered rewards system:

Tier (Effective Balance) APR Boost
1,440,032 - 3,200,000 ETH 10%
3,200,032 - 4,000,000 ETH 7.5%
4,000,032 - 4,800,000 ETH 6%
4,800,032 - 5,600,000 ETH 5%
5,600,032 - 6,400,000 ETH 3.5%

Reward Calculation

Network Fee Adjustment Under Pectra

Because the SSV Network contracts will continue to charge protocol fees per validator, and not by effective balance, a mechanism is required to collect proportional network fees from larger validators.

As such:

  • The IMP will deduct the uncollected network fee portion (beyond the 32 ETH base) directly from the validator’s IMP reward.
  • This deduction will only apply to validators with an effective balance exceeding 32 ETH.
  • For validators with 32 ETH, network fees remain fully collected via protocol contracts and no deduction will occur.
  • If a participant’s calculated IMP reward is less than their network fee obligation, they will not receive any reward. Instead, the amount they did accrue will be fully attributed to cover their network fees. In this case, the unpaid portion of their fees will be effectively absorbed by the network and not counted toward the total expected network fees.

This ensures cost alignment across all validators with varying effective balance without requiring immediate changes to protocol-level smart contracts logic.

Calculation Formula


Validator’s effective balance is measured at the last epoch of each day.

Appendix: Historical Contracts Attribution Mapping

The following contract addresses that previously registered validators will retain reward attribution to their deployer addresses to maintain backward compatibility. This list is immutable and no new entries will be added. In the interest of efficiency, the Incentivized Mainnet Program Administrator will be able to add addresses to the table below, so as to cover addresses that join until the end of month May.

Contract Address Deployer Address (“Reward Address”)
0x06a45f4a92fa07e93b314790ee03bb754f5da628 0x14727c710ba8ef84481b03d718c92812bfcb6058
0x08b804864e367416924775cb96c3d7ba40cc81f6 0x0050ee455720cc8baba740a622311f8f2d8ac0aa
0x0921381ffbeac9f5c516762e6e5dd9606682e0b1 0xa3cda4cb624a1fc093ea9486bbd47aa9a8774b08
0x18169ee0ced9aa744f3cd01adc6e2eb2e8fb0087 0x5de069482ac1db318082477b7b87d59dfb313f91
0x19c4016b667f8f049a6d0b93855141dab341f44d 0x86ac462eb1524efd9652e5833f844232da3ddde5
0x20313af216272eff3285cdc0be862fa9ae3a0ca3 0xf02ea45d3f350f5bca63fa13908ac39ae2cc2180
0x21979d8e139cf5344f9a6858196126b9b6d96d88 0x5b3ef7ed14ab4a240b8290d86a5b1e662e1d618c
0x29984aadadb3927fb8c0cf5a539a282f39066332 0x62a90760c7ce5cbadbb64188ad075e9a52518d41
0x29cada9320a4d068d1f4651b9ac0aa10745317ff 0x4ff2fa3a8ea8a12dd54e2ca0eaf02da785c660ef
0x34edb2ee25751ee67f68a45813b22811687c0238 0x4b91827516f79d6f6a1f292ed99671663b09169a
0x411fa6e02e08d0dd0db3b9167f8c349039288954 0xa53a6fe2d8ad977ad926c485343ba39f32d3a3f6
0x45acf8f7a8232ee4cee6294de58075c1565d4df3 0x9d4fd64feb016eab2ee450703f4efc1b2eb14deb
0x4685db8bf2df743c861d71e6cfb5347222992076 0x4b91827516f79d6f6a1f292ed99671663b09169a
0x4dc0bf9b18f9c550786a67ef42569d6337c4e78c 0xd4f962494c3f70244bf3dd3a2c55132da56da880
0x4f6e412580e7a93a104836d596f8d6c8be0ef431 0xca30d150b590826a4633a5f99e05ad6571f9bb66
0x5071e29f49f9b008267d2ed76d54b32d91695cde 0x3202b5b0602274197ccb22b8c02cec9539990c7c
0x525c9c957f6b5796d0521b5c04313a8466e2a4c1 0x776e273eef19cf80c1ea17b193fc86c3b581995a
0x537a684be8f528172a68c987c15ff45a4c82ebb2 0xc316e05be8c3b688c0276be3149010391e8a58e6
0x5b2b6a36ed514eb02aa8c61e18ea75a5b4520159 0xa3594a4bd05bbefb213ba88e3b969207365d9e81
0x5bbe36152d3cd3eb7183a82470b39b29eedf068b 0xd2fd442a68cc17a967e31b4712df110a6d0ff513
0x5ed8b5b1bcac0adb3205a779a70b7e6cc285c2bb 0x62a90760c7ce5cbadbb64188ad075e9a52518d41
0x6161a36b7bd4d469a11803535816aac9829ad5cc 0xf304a4229561aeba13425710acf1f46c9f24f1eb
0x67cd91fa3f9bbd96c7f5fc59a54b1b85a4c3a50b 0xaa41ca850323660e85af507548449f3aba2b5a19
0x6b5de3b71f927fb3988f3ae8254ccc2bf6b20b14 0x3af2189c656890d55701ed290b532885844eea5f
0x737483bc858d6bb66962e27a4bd8612cca818d37 0xe86a0f19e06146d1c30bb37607d549077b3541b2
0x772b4fb7c9c221be324df548b295ccfaecd9941b 0xaa41ca850323660e85af507548449f3aba2b5a19
0x7dc028d840923ecfa8a1c088700e474e3214b52f 0xf4cbb755be3c9eec013f67dbc1896efccbefcd2a
0x87393be8ac323f2e63520a6184e5a8a9cc9fc051 0x36e655069464be6202e0e4d5ee9f76034c0ad9b6
0x88f9518919f051f0845a34b793897a941d84d43a 0xae38e358f871aae431a74c82e53fe81e0a13deb9
0x8cbe11227b437c842fc4c93402d5088dc8044137 0x12227dfe5363cbe55919e230653810de0ff317e2
0x944991724cfa9e218f73ba03608913da9a21f9b7 0x971561f9ab29acbd6d1dc7b17f0bb6c386ad311b
0x9501a0da5ac0671b6744d1c951863ac2b794d282 0x71955e1b30e2b0585188466f1b241b6004d75dc4
0x9e7dba478ff82243d07bc88a74319c0e35c802b1 0xf95aa110636f466ddec95598e6c661b921243665
0xa456c36582ad81ca6091dd78e0c97ba309ff11e9 0x02b97fec5023f321865155304c71aa0c3db25d29
0xa5f4ed518286ed614fe317c95d8a287a94c923c9 0x726849ba03d72b5c4f58da88e4709df4a461ca01
0xab80312f79209409b638b261c61fe73070d12818 0xcfafc6bdd1b92e510d5409ee460bb1a712165aa8
0xaf5f9d8e61b37777d67e9647c1815e79c599d4c4 0x62a90760c7ce5cbadbb64188ad075e9a52518d41
0xb27a34dd7abcb8133503c989d0c95be1cd1ad34a 0x2cf21faa2d4e3f5c6517def04e1b3912da22d5ec
0xb5f1c25b24be33dc3b67274f0ad0b81c3e38606f 0xa3cda4cb624a1fc093ea9486bbd47aa9a8774b08
0xb8e36e5f926ee4928ce564050148c902f7cb782b 0xa4bc74b650241ae2f90225b5789d687c2e26b440
0xc2d42368d94e2d5d82f3b05a06ec53ebfb81ce0f 0xf304a4229561aeba13425710acf1f46c9f24f1eb
0xcef46057e46a9b73f77ca048f7fd511234525c39 0x08ff7150cdeb62a81418ebe0f1125faea3044ade
0xd8af7e871b20c6a84d78ef458bbc252d39802104 0x0b63d2376418700db73abce955b3cf03a352a310
0xdf8f9a7f1f8eb645dc3c95354d2c909c2fdaf0e3 0x0cdb34e6a4d635142bb92fe403d38f636bbb77b8
0xe20b1678ae31e02a1b16693852328c77a4913b72 0x0cdb34e6a4d635142bb92fe403d38f636bbb77b8
0xe58447a964cf024d4937f53c884e4e6fc4a0514f 0x342433010665645177648141e12efc3138625cb0
0xe64d3d794e309d91b2b7ef4ae941cbe713a72d3a 0xee77a176baea6c8239fef04a6dea02027933f416
0xe98538a0e8c2871c2482e1be8cc6bd9f8e8ffd63 0x4b91827516f79d6f6a1f292ed99671663b09169a
0xeeb77a24dc66658223cddba668b72e812f3fde67 0xaa41ca850323660e85af507548449f3aba2b5a19
0xf39ac5187ef76203fe800f0beda87a148561b341 0x5c6c197c27d5bf73929e1aba7d451bbdf53e6ce8
0xfea4e5869b38815533044fa08baafcb87354e66f 0x46fe7ee7c4e15406ae79e09b7087a61ba1725ba2
4 Likes

Love it.

Just one question, how mechanically number of active validators define the Tier that applies. Do you look at the last day of the month to determine the Tier? Or is it max or average of the month?

Hypotheticaly, for example if the month of April had 97k validators on 4/1 , then 105k on 4/15, and then 98k on 4/30 with daily average of 101k, which Tier will be applied to calculate rewards?

Also, could you pls provide a link to snapshot for this vote

4 Likes

Thank you very much for bringing this forward! Much-needed clarity on Pectra and the IMP.

I have a set of questions:

Pectra Compatibility Updates

Ethereum’s Pectra upgrade will enable validators to increase their maximum effective balance from 32 ETH up to 2048 ETH. This unlocks the ability to consolidate multiple existing validators into a single validator with higher effective balance, significantly improving efficiency and cost-effectiveness for operators.

To support this shift, the IMP will move from a per-validator model to an effective balance-based model for calculating rewards and tier placement.

Q: Why use the IMP to account for Pectra instead of updating the protocol? Isn’t updating the protocol inevitable at some point in the future? What are the mid-term plans? Does this mean that the SSV Labs team isn’t expecting a huge shift towards consolidated validators? Please share some rationale.

Q: Given past IMP data, what impact does this have on the population, and why 95% and not any other number?

Q: What’s the current cycle’s data? I’m having a hard time understanding what this means.

Q: This confuses me. Exactly 32 ETH? Or does that mean “non-consolidated” and simply >=32 ETH || <64 ETH? Can you please demonstrate a scenario?

Q: What is the statement here? That the DAO forgo the fee, as there is no way to deduct it? In which scenario can the IMP rewards be less than the network fee obligation?

Q: When does a day in Ethereum end? :laughing:

Q: Why the end of May and not April to not have any overlap with Pectra and keep things super simple?

2 Likes

中国社区的成员看过来,我总结了关于这个提案的重要内容,也欢迎各位参与投票:Your connected workspace for wiki, docs & projects | Notion

1 Like

This DIP-34 revision proposal is a critical adjustment to the SSV Network incentive plan. It is not just about “distributing money,” but also aims to:

  1. Maintain Growth Momentum: By expanding the scope of rewards, continue attracting more validators to join the SSV ecosystem.
  2. Adapt to External Changes: Proactively adjust its own incentive mechanism to be compatible with major upgrades in the Ethereum core protocol (Pectra), ensuring SSV’s competitiveness in the future staking landscape.
  3. Optimize Internal Mechanisms: Increase performance requirements for participants, simplify reward processes, and proactively address potential fee structure issues brought by Pectra.

I strongly support this proposal !

2 Likes

To some extent, IMP has put selling pressure on SSV tokens. As an extension for IMP is being considered, I would like to understand the factors behind the new tier’s APR settings and how they were determined. Thank you.

2 Likes

Big thanks to Ivan for presenting DIP-34. The proposed updates to the Incentivized Mainnet Program are substantial, and I’m broadly supportive. Here’s my high-level summary and a few points for discussion:


1. Proposal Overview

  • Tiered Rewards Restructuring: Adjusts APR boosts across validator count tiers (e.g. 45k–100k → 10%, 100k–125k → 7.5%, down to 175k–200k → 3.5%).
  • Effective-Balance Model: Post-Pectra (max 2048 ETH per validator), shifts from “per-validator” to “effective-balance” tiers, with corresponding APR bands (1.44M–3.2M ETH → 10%, etc.).
  • Eligibility & Attribution: Raises daily attestation threshold from 90% to 95%, and standardizes “Reward Address” attribution to the original registrant address (EOA or contract), with exceptions for existing SimpleDVT/CSM distributor contracts.
  • Reward Calculation Updates: Uses current-cycle ETH/SSV price averages (versus prior-month) and deducts the extra network fee portion beyond 32 ETH directly from IMP rewards for high-balance validators.
  • Phased Rollout: Refactored validator-count tiers kick in for April distribution; all other revisions (including Pectra-based updates) start in May, with Pectra provisions effective after the fork is live.

2. Key Benefits

  • Scalability: New tiers keep incentives aligned as SSV scales toward 200k+ validators and larger effective balances.
  • Future-Proofing: Effective-balance approach seamlessly handles Pectra’s 2048 ETH cap, avoiding manual contract rewrites.
  • Performance-Driven: Raising the attestation bar to 95% drives better network health and reliability.
  • Fairness & Transparency: Standardizing attribution simplifies reward flows; clearly outlined appendix preserves backward compatibility for old contracts.

3. Discussion Points & Clarifications

  1. Attestation Threshold
    • Does 95% still strike the right balance between security and operator realism? Should we pilot this on testnet first?
  2. Price Feeds & Calculation Timing
    • Which oracles will supply the “current-cycle” ETH/SSV averages? On-chain (Chainlink) or off-chain (CoinGecko)?
    • When exactly during the cycle will price snapshots be taken, and how will we handle data anomalies?
  3. Network Fee Deduction Logic
    • For validators consolidating to >32 ETH, the fee-deduction-from-reward mechanism is clever—but how do we handle edge cases where rewards ≪ fees? (Proposal says fees absorb shortfalls, but clarity on accounting/reporting would help.)
  4. Transition & Communication
    • How will operators be notified of the April vs. May rollout split? A detailed schedule would help staking providers plan migrations.
  5. Monitoring & KPIs
    • Propose tracking post-implementation metrics: average validator effective balance, attestation success rate, and IMP uptake by tier—reported monthly to the DAO.

4. Conclusion
DIP-34 thoughtfully advances the IMP to support SSV’s growth trajectory and Ethereum’s upcoming Pectra fork. Locking in stronger performance requirements, future-proofing reward calculations, and clarifying attribution are all positive steps. Addressing the data-source specifics, timing details, and communication plan will ensure a smooth rollout. Looking forward to the community’s feedback and fine-tuning these important updates!

2 Likes

The Tier that applies for a given month is determined based on the number of eligible validators at any point throughout the distribution cycle (month). It is not based on the last day of the month or the average number of validators.

If the number of eligible validators crosses a Tier threshold at any point during the month — even if only briefly — the higher Tier is applied for reward calculations for the entire month.

e.g., April started with 97k validators, increased to 105k mid-month, and then ended with 98k - because the number of eligible validators crossed 100k during the month, the Tier corresponding to “100k+” would be applied for calculating April’s rewards.

2 Likes

Currently, the protocol settles payments (operator and network fees) through its smart contracts, using a per-validator fee structure. Supporting higher effective balances of validators — as introduced by Pectra — would require a fundamental shift to a validator effective balance-based fee model.

However, a validator’s effective balance is not available on-chain for smart contracts to access. This makes it infeasible to support this change purely through the current on-chain settlement mechanisms without significant architectural modifications.

Given these constraints, the Incentivized Mainnet Program (IMP), which operates off-chain, is an ideal short-term solution to account for Pectra-related changes. It allows flexibility without introducing complexity or degradation to the existing user experience.

Looking mid-to-long term:

  • Unless the payment settlement logic is fundamentally changed, it will remain difficult to fully support validator effective balance-based models on-chain.
  • The SSV Chain, which is currently under development, will allow us to natively handle these needs in a way that is optimized and customized for the network’s requirements.
  • Therefore, until the SSV Chain is ready, we propose to continue handling Pectra-related adjustments through the IMP rather than complicating the current smart contract infrastructure.
  • Attempting an interim smart contract change would still lack important capabilities, hurt the user experience, and introduce added complexity into node operations and liquidation processes — all of which we want to avoid.

Initially, the 90% threshold was set when the protocol was still new, and the ecosystem was in its early stages. It provided flexibility while the network matured. However, 90% has become a relatively low standard compared to current network performance benchmarks.

As the network grew, scaled, and became more battle-tested, it is important to raise the bar and push for higher validator reliability. The 95% threshold is suggested as a gradual and reasonable increase — a meaningful step forward without being overly punitive.

In practice, very few validators operate consistently below 95%, so the immediate impact on the validator population would be minimal. However, raising the standard is expected to incentivize better performance and operational discipline across the network over time.

Today, when calculating ETH and SSV price averages, as well as Ethereum APR for reward distribution, the model uses the previous month’s data.
For example, for rewards distributed for the March cycle, the ETH price, SSV price, and Ethereum APR averages were taken from February.

This introduces a potential mismatch between the data used and the actual cycle for which rewards are distributed.

To address this, the proposal suggests calculating the averages based on the current month — the same month in which the distribution occurs.

This change would minimize discrepancies and make the rewards more accurately reflect the conditions of the actual month being rewarded.

The smart contracts today do not have a notion of effective balances. They charge network fees per registered validator, regardless of whether the validator’s effective balance is 32 ETH, 64 ETH, or any other amount.

The reference to 32 ETH is simply because it is the standard lower bound for a validator’s effective balance — it was used as a point of reference, not as a strict technical threshold.

As a way to overcome this limitation, it is proposed that the off-chain IMP script would fetch the effective balance of each validator and calculate the delta between what is actually charged on-chain and what the validator should be paying according to their effective balance.

Scenario example:

  • A validator with either 32 ETH or 64 ETH would both pay the same network fee on-chain through the smart contract.
  • Under the IMP script logic:
    • A validator with 64 ETH (essentially equivalent to running two 32 ETH validators) should be paying double the network fee.
    • To correct this, an additional network fee equivalent to another 32 ETH validator would be deducted from that validator’s IMP rewards to close the gap.

The statement refers to specific cases where a validator’s IMP rewards may be lower than the additional network fee obligation calculated off-chain.

In such cases, the DAO would effectively forgo the remaining fee difference because there would be no way to fully deduct it.

An example scenario would be:

  • A validator with a large effective balance is registered on the network throughout the month.
  • However, the validator was inactive for significant portions of the month (e.g., underperforming or simply was not deposited).
  • As a result, the validator was not eligible for IMP rewards for the full duration of the month.

In this situation, the additional network fee (based on the validator’s effective balance) might exceed the rewards the validator actually earned.

Since deductions can only happen against earned rewards, the DAO would forgo the unpaid portion of the network fee that could not be covered.

The script is based on the beaconcha.in reference, which uses the last epoch of the day according to UTC+3 time.

The decision to set the cutoff at the end of May instead of end of April was made to give ample time for partners to make necessary adjustments.

The changes require updates to their integrations, specifically to the smart contracts they use to register validators to the SSV network.

Since such updates might require audits and other internal processes on their side, providing an extra month offers partners more leeway and flexibility.

3 Likes

Great proposal. When it’s going to be posted on https://snapshot.box/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth and how long it’s usually up for vote?

2 Likes

Etherenodes support this proposal in general terms, as SSV has to be competitive at least until Based Apps roll out and more use cases (aka more yield) for validators come into play.

The main point we’re worried about is the “reward calculation” and “Network Fee Adjustment Uder Pectra”:

What happens once the IMP comes to an end and there is no way to adjust the network fee with the IMP incomes?
What happens if there ir a fee change that actually put a cluster with consolidated validators at liquidation risk & the fee upgrade is done before the Network Fee is deducted? Could that be an scenario in which a cluster can be liquidated?

We think there has to be a major upgrade on the way fees are calculated and keep them fully collected via protocol contracts. It’s the most common use case for SSV token right now and it shouldn’t work with a temporary measure based on a temporary Incentive Program.

2 Likes

I support this as is, but since this creates a great deal of sell pressure, I think the intention should be to end this program as soon as we can (when based apps/SSV 2.0 provide additional income to replace it). Hopefully that will be before the end of the specified term.

2 Likes

Thanks @BenAffleck for asking for clarification, and thanks @arielzimroni for clearing things up!

Is there a risk we are just continually moving the goalposts? Is there a point of adoption at which IMP should end? If so, what is that point?

:vertical_traffic_light: Voting is now live:

[DIP-34] Incentivized Mainnet Program - Revision #3

@OperatorX Voting is now live on Snapshot!

People not gonna sell the token at $70M valuation of the company that runs 10% of Ethereum network; Just a little bit of patience and team execution on long term growth should lead to $1B eventually

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I think the current answer to @Hackworth’s question is what @fod said.

When additional rewards become available for both validators and operators, the DAO should reevaluate the situation. It may even consider ending the IMP before its scheduled conclusion, which is anticipated to occur when we reach an effective balance of 6,400,000 ETH (approximately 200,000 validators, assuming no one consolidates after Pectra).

As per @arielzimroni response, the mid-term solution is the SSV Chain that allows us to not rely on the IMP to correct for fees. Furthermore, the need for the IMP might be questioned again once SSV 2.0 materializes. So, I agree that any of those solutions need to come before the IMP with its new terms ends.

@arielzimroni?

:100:

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  1. The contract liquidation mechanism stays the same
  2. I don’t really follow your race conditions - the IM is calculated in retro for an historic period.